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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Respondent
-'J-

RORERT STEVEN SMITH

Case No.

19053

Defendant/Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, ROBERT STEVEN SMITH, appeals from a judgment
and conviction of Attempted Robbery, a Third Degree Felony, and

Attempted Burglary, a Third Degree Felony, in the Third Judicial
J1str1ct Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
"he Honorable David B. Dee presiding.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was convicted by a jury of Attempted Robbery,
"

Degree Felony, and Attempted Burglary, a Third Degree
in violation of §76-6-301, §76-6-202, and §76-4-101,

'•.t11

Code Ann.

(1978).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the conviction and judgrnenL
against him reversed and the charges dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 15, 1981,

Robert Steven Smith was arrested

by personnel in the South Salt Lake City Police Department
(Trial transcript for 1/14/83 at 193, 1/18/83 at 26).

On

that date, statements were given to the South Salt Lake City
Police by Brian Scott Moss and Gilbert Anthony Sisneros which
implicated Appellant in an alleged burglary and robbery
scheme in the household of Myra E. Kuhre.

(Findings,

and Order on Motion to Dismiss on the Grounds of Pre-Accusation
Delay, Dated January 11, 1983, at 2 (hereinafter cited as
Findings)).

Those allegations formed the basis for the

charges contained in a four count Information that was filed
against the appellant on September 7, 1982 (Findings at 5),
which case was then tried below in the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, beginning January 13, 1983.
From October 15, 1981, to the present date, Appellam
has been in the custody of the Utah State Prison (Findings at
4).

On the above date, prior to his arrest, Appellant was a

resident in a half-way house on a work release status. Id.
Due to the arrest by the South Salt Lake City Police resulti"P
from the accusations by the above-named witnesses, Appellant',

-2-

half "'ay house status was revoked and he was returned to the
Utah State Prison (Findings at 4).

He remained in prison

pending the filing of the charges and the trial of this case.

Id,

A January 12, 1982, parole date that had been set for

Appellant was rescinded by the Board of Pardons due to the
suspected criminal activity that is the subject of this
case

(Findings at 4, 5).
Evidence of Appellant's involvement in the crimes

charged in this case was first obtained by law enforcement
authorities on October 15, 1983.

(Findings at 2).

That

evidence consisted of post-Miranda statements given by Brian
Scott Moss and Gilbert Anthony Sisneros.

In brief summary,

those statements indicated that Moss and Sisneros had been
picked up by Appellant on October 15, 1981, that materials
for a burglary were in the car, and that a plan was made to
burglarize the home of Myre E. Kuhre.
At trial, the only evidence adduced that went to
the guilt of Robert Steven Smith was the above testimony
from Brian Scott Moss and Gilbert Anthony Sisneros (see
tcariscript of trial in general).

-3-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNNECESSARY DELAY BY THE STATE OF
APPROXIMATELY ELEVEN MONTHS BETWEEN
APPELLANT'S ARREST AND THE DATE
FORMAL CHARGES WERE FILED AGAINST
HIM VIOLATED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.
A.

THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL IS A FUNDAMENTAL
GUARANTEE OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND SERVES
TO PROTECT ACCUSED PEOPLE FROM MISCARRIAGES
OF JUSTICE.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial • .

The Magna

Carta set forth the right in 1215, stating, "We will sell to
no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice
or right."
(1967)

Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223

citing to Magna Carta, C 29

Charter of 1215]

(1225)

[c 40 of King John's

in footnote 8.

Sir Edward Coke noted

delay of a trial would improperly deny justice and would be
contrary to the law and custom of England.

Klopfer at 224.

The Supreme Court in Klopfer noted our founding fathers
considered the right fundamental.

Id. at 225.

The Sixth Amendment Right to Speedy Trial has multipi.
purposes.
893

People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y.

353,

355,

130 N.E. 2d Bql

(1955), sets forth three purposes of the guarantee.

First, it protects the accused against prolonged imprisonment.
Second, it relieves the accused of anxiety and public susri 1· 1 c

-4-

Tl<i, rl,

it protects him from hazards of standing trial so far

ternoverl in time that means of proving his innocence are no
longer available.

The third enumerated reason is particularly

important for the accused who is imprisoned because he is at
lease able to assist in preparation of his defense.
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966).

See

This Court

noted the purpose of the Sixth Amendment to prevent undue
and oppressive pretrial detention, minimize the anxiety
and concern of unresolved accusations and prevent the
miscarriage of justice caused by the impaired ability of the
defendant to prepare a defense in State v. Lozano, 23 Utah
2d 312, 314, 426 P.2d 710

(1969).

In the leading case of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,
519-20 (1972), the Supreme Court established the societal
interest in preservation of the right.

The Court noted speedy

trials would reduce the likelihood of crimes being committed
by those free on pretrial release programs.

The Court also

noted accused people might be more inclined to manipulate pleas
because of overcrowded court calendars, thereby weakening the
•c1

iminal justice system.

1 •c:rease
- > tPn<l

Also, delays in coming to trial

the chances of success in the rehabilitation process
i n'J the

length of time before an accused can be

-5-

admitted into such a program.

Finally, the Court noted the

financial and administrative costs incurred by lengthy
pretrial detention.
B. THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL ATTACHED
OCTOBER 15, 1981, WHEN APPELLANT WAS
ARRESTED.
The Supreme Court, in Dillingham v. United States,
432 U.S. 64

(1975), addressed the question of when the right

to a Speedy Trial attached.

That decision held that a 22-month

delay between the petitioner's arrest and indictment
unconstitutional deprivation of his Sixth Amendment speedy
trial rights.

In so holding, the Court further concluded that

"it is readily understandable that it is either a formal indict·
ment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by
arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the
particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the
Sixth Amendment."

Id. at 65 (emphasis added). Quoting from

United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), the Court reasone:,
"On its face, the protection of the [Sixth] Amendment is
activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and
only to those persons who have been 'accused' in the course of
that prosecution." Id. at 64-65.

The court continued:

"Invocation of the speedy trial provision thus need not await
indictment, information, or other formal charge."

Applying

Dillingham to the present case, Mr. Smith's Sixth Amendment
attached on the date of his arrest, not the date he was formal!
charged.
-6-

In United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971),
rourt had earlier addressed the question of whether a
three year delay in the pre-indictment period constituted
either an unconstitutional denial of due process or an
unconstitutional denial of the Sixth Amendment right to
speedy trial.

In holding the delay was not unconstitutional,

the Court found the Sixth Amendment right did not attach
until the indictment was handed down.

Factually Marion

differs from the case at bar because in Marion the arrests did
not occur until after the indictment.

In the present case,

Mr. Smith was arrested October 15, 1981, and not charged until
September 7, 19 8 2.

There fore, he stood "accused" on October 15,

1981, and was protected by speedy trial provisions of the Sixth

Amendment.

Marion at 325.

See also United States v. Lovasco,

431 U.S. 783 (1977), where the Court held no violation of speedy
trial rights due to a pre-indictment delay of 18 months since
the occurrance of the offense.

Again, no arrest took place

until after the indictment, distinguishing Lovasco from the

State v. Almeida, 509 P.2d 549, 551 (Hawaii 1973),
i

•o iJ0s further support for the time of arrest as triggering
, • <>t<'ctions of the Sixth Amendment.

-7-

In Almeida, the

court explained that either formal indictment or information

01

restraint of liberty imposed by arrest, whichever occurred
first, would commence the protection of the Sixth Amendment.
C.

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
IS NOT SUPPLANTED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.

Although both Dillingham and Marion make it clear
that the speedy trial provisions of the Sixth Amendment attach
upon the arrest of the accused, the argument might be made that
a state's statute of limitations provisions are the exclusive
remedy available to Appellant.

It is admitted that the

Information in the case at bar was filed within the applicable
statute of limitations period.
Ann.

See §76-1-302, Utah Code

( 19 7 8 ) .
Reliance upon the §76-1-302 Utah Code Ann., however,

would be misplaced in this case.

The Marion Court asserts that

although the speedy trial right attaches upon the arrest of
the defendant, it does not apply to the period of time between
the crime and the arrest or charge.

Id. at 322.

The applicable

statute of limitations protests us all during that period.
Upon arrest or charge, however, the additional speedy trial
protection attaches so as to "present undue and oppressive
incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern
accompanying public accusations and to limit the possibilitieo
-8-

long delay will impair the ability of the accused to defend

u-,,,t

himself."

United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966).

Although the statute of limitations serves the same purpose
its protections as an exclusive remedy apply only to the
pre-arrest time period.

l

It, therefore, is not the exclusive

remedy available to the Appellant in the case at bar.
D.
THIS COURT SHOULD ANALYZE APPELLANT'S
CASE IN THE LIGHT OF BARKER V. WINGO.
In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519-20, 530-33
(1972), the Supreme Court set forth a comprehensive four factor
balancing test in assessing claims of denial of speedy trial
later adopted by this Court in State v. Hafen, 593 P.2d 538
(Utah 1979).

In Barker, the Court held continuances over a

five and one-half year period were not a denial of the
defendant's right to speedy trial.
is

Although none of the factors

to be determinative, each is to be balanced against the

others in deciding whether the delay becomes unconstitutional.
The four factors enumerated are:
12)

the reasons for the delay, including good faith prosecutorial

efforts;
l,
1

(1) the length of the delay;

,,,t
Jl'I

()) whether and when the defendant asserted the right;

course, if actual prejudice is asserted, the Due Process
would be an additional remedy available to the defendant.

-9-

and (4) whether the defendant suffered any prejudice.
United States v. Lovasco stated the test must embrace the
notions of "whether the action complained of • • . violates
those 'fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the
base of our civil and political institutions,

and

which define 'the community's sense of fair play and decency.'"
431 U.S. at 790.
In applying the four Barker factors to the case
at bar, Petitioner contends the scales tip in his favor.
First, the delay was almost eleven months; from October 15,
1981, the date he was arrested to September 7, 1982, the date
he was formally charged.

The State's only valid articulated

reason for a delay was because of an "ongoing investigation"
until March or April 1982.

However, no new evidence was

discovered during the five or six month "investigation."
In Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1965),
the court held due process under the Fifth Amendment had
been denied when formal charges were delayed for an
oppressive and unjustifiable time after the offense . .
The case involved a narcotics transaction in which the
government wished to continue using the agent in ongoing
investigation in other drug sales before disclosing his
identity.

Specifically the court noted no new evidence
-10-

""s
'1,1pJ

during the delay and the agent had, in fact
icated some of his earlier discoveries.

Id. at 212.

Thee court frowned on the fact that the delay so hindered the

memory of the narcotics agent, he was only able to testify
from a recollection refreshed just before trial by referring
to entries in a notebook.
In the present case, the State's chief witness,

Mr. Moss, was unable to consistently remember his version
of the events during the four times he testified.

He testified

about the events on October 15, 1981, January 11, 1982, during
a preliminary hearing and again at trial.

Some of his

inconsistencies as well as those of the other State witness,
Mr. Sisneros, are set forth below:
"Question.

And as a matter of fact, calling

your attention to the sworn deposition of January 11th,
1982,

isn't it a fact that in that statement you had previously

stated that when Mr. Smith drove by to pick you up at 21st
and 3rd East that Mr. Pearson was with him at that time,
right?
"Answer.
"Question.
·"'"1' "as

Yes.
And today you stated that, no, Mr.

not with him but Mr. Smith was alone; is that

,,,.,-t

"Answer.

Yes.
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"Question.
here

Okay.

Also, in the same deposition

(indicating) of January 11th, you stated that there

was no conversation between the time of being picked up
at 21st South and 3rd East and the time that you drove to
21st South and 5th East regarding any plans; is that
correct?
"Answer.
"Question.

Yes.
So there were no conversations.

But today you come in and you now say that there was extensive
conversations about the illegality

about the plan and what

was to be done, et cetera; right?
"Answer.
"Question.

Yeah.
All right.

Do you have

did you have on you when you left from school
to go to school that morning?

what else
when you left

What else did you have with

you?
"Answer.

Just the hat and the stocking and my

gloves."
Do you recall his testimony that he had a black
pair of leather gloves at the time?
"Question.

Okay, now talking about these orange

gloves here, Exhibit No. 6, when •lid you say you first saw
those gloves?
"Answer.
"Question.

When Mr. Pearson got them out of his car.
Allright.

bring back?
-12-

And how many pairs did he

"Answer.
those ones.

When I talked--he had two.

There was

And like I was talking to Mr. Housley, he had

a brown pair of leather ones."
This is after he had told Mr. Housley that he
only brought one pair of gloves, the orange pair of gloves.
Now, on cross-examination in an attempt to ferret
out the truth now we have two sets of gloves.

And you recall

Detective Judd's testimony regarding the search on Moss at
the time, at the South Salt Lake Police Station.
gloves, if any, did you find on the people?"
he found no gloves.

"How many

Mr. Judd said

He didn't find a brown leather pair or

black leather pair.
(T. 47-48, January 19, 1983, Closing Argument).
The varied testimony of both Mr. Moss and Mr. Sisneros
shows that their memory was hindered by the delay.

Unlike

the narcotics agent in Ross, they were unable to refresh their
recollection from notebooks.

Such faulty memory is another

reason to disallow unwarranted delays in charging Appellant.
tice cannot be met when time-warped testimony reflects such
inaccuracies.
The delay in the present case, just as the court found
k
i1en t- _
)

T\ \

'1 1

ln Ross, was not necessary for effective law enforce-

lie re,

the State did not assert there were undercover

whose identity could not be revealed at the time, no

-··U1cr ,!,,fendC1nts were added after the investigation in the case,

1
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nor was any new evidence or witness discovered during the
delay.

The only evidence the State ever procured against

Appellant was obtained at the time of his arrest.

Thus,

the State has not adequately justified the delay from
October, 1981, to March, 1982.
Finally, while the prosecutor's August, 1982, vacatioc
may, arguendo, explain the one month delay from August, 1982,
to September, 1982, it does not account for the delay from
April, 1982, to August, 1982.

The bare assertion by the

State that the delay in filing the information was due to an
ongoing investigation must be viewed as no justification at all
for a delay which amounted to eleven months.
The third factor listed in Barker has been called
the Demand Doctrine.

At one time, defendants were held to have

waived their right to speedy trial by failure to demand it.
Appellant, however, asserted his right in a timely fashion by
filing a 120 day request for disposition of detainers in the
latter part of October, 1981,. and again in September, 1982.
(Finding at 5).

The Demand Doctrine, however, has been rejects"

by the Supreme Court in Barker, which simply considers a derna":
as one of many factors to be considered in determining whether
defendant's speedy trial right is violated.

In United States

Chase, 135 F. Supp. 230, 231 (N.D. Ill. 1955), the court statci,
"The stakes are too high to imply a waiver on his part . .
require a man to beg for trial on such a charge, with its
enormous pena 1 ty, requires too much of human nature."
-14-

In

r2·,·l_()r_"· United States, 238 F. 2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956), the
,: 0 11r r rP jected the doctrine because there was no showing the

defendant, who was incarcerated in New York, knew of the
indictment against him.

That case carries particular significance

liere where the Appellant could not know of any indictment or

charge against him because there was none until September, 1982.
In People v.

Prosser, 130 N.E. 2d 891, 895

(N.Y. 1955), Judge

Fuld noted it is the state which initiates the action and the
state that has the duty to see that the defendant is brought
to trial.

In the Supreme Court case of Dillingham v. United

States, 423 U .s. 64

(1975), where the post-arrest, pre-indictment

delay was held to deny petitioner his right to speedy trial, the
petitioner's motions were made post-arraignment and post-trial.
423 IJ .s.

at 64.

Since there is no Utah case law directly on point,

Appellant urges this Court to reject the Demand Doctrine,
consider it simply to be one factor to weigh, and find that
the filing of the 120 dispositions was a good-faith effort
by

Appellant to demand a trial in this case.
The fourth factor of Barker's balancing test require
assessment of the prejudice to the defendant caused

'="!

the delay.

'' t-1"

The Barker Court identifies three interests

accu:;ocl protected by the speedy trial right which,

-,,IT",,-,_,misecl, would result in prejudice to the accused.
ar,_,:

( lJ

dLCl'tdtinn;

the prevention of oppressive pre-trial
(2)

the minimization of anxiety and concern of

-15-

the accused; and (3) the limitation of the possibility that th"
defense will be impaired.

Barker at 532.

See also Klopfer v.

North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 218, 222 (1967).
Regarding the first of the above interests, Barker
expresses concern that the obvious societal disadvantages of
long pre-trial incarceration are even more serious for the
accused who cannot obtain his release.

Barker v. Wingo at 532.

The detrimental impact of such incarceration is felt by the
individual through the resulting loss of employment, disruption
of family life, the enforcement of idleness, and the curtailment
of rehabilitation. Id. The anxiety and concern of the accused
caused by the delay between accusation and trial has long
been recognized as central to the reason for the existance of
the speedy trial right, United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116
(1966), and virtually mandates the conclusion that a defendant

is always prejudiced by such delay.

Finally Barker asserts that

"if a defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his ability to
gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his
defense."

Barker v. Wingo at 533 (emphasis added).
In the present case, all of these above interests

have compromised.

The Appellant was in a half-way house prior

to his October 15, 1981, arrest.

In a half-way house,

rehabilitation proceeds apace, employment is available, and
as a result idleness is avoided.

As a result of his arrest,

Appellant was returned to the Utah State Prison and thus was
compelled to take a giant step uackward from the above goals.
-16-

The anxiety, concern and frustration which would necessarily
result from eleven months of wondering what the status the
charges was needs no further description than simply this
statement.

Finally, the impairment of Appellant's defense

is equally clear on its face.

Detailed investigation of who

the Appellant's accusers were, what their involvement was in
the matter, as well as investigation of other witnesses is
critical to a case which is based, at least as it related
to Appellant, solely on the confession testimony of two
witnesses regarding conversations which occurred on only one
or two specific occasions.

Prevention of defendant's involve-

ment in such investigation due to his incarceration, exacerbated
by the passage of time, diluted the ability of the defense to
reconstruct what actually transpired during the alleged
conversations.
Guidance in balancing the above factors is provided
by the Barker Court's own balancing efforts in that case.

After concluding that the length of time was too long and
unjustifiable, the Court further found that that factor was
'.'l!twcighed by the prejudice being minimal and the fact that the
C•endant did not want a speedy trial.
In the present case, the fact that the delay was
',,,,,,ij"1c1idy

shorter than that in Barker, is counterbalanced

-17-

by the factors that the Appellant demonstrated a desire to

ha'.'"

the case resolved by filing a 120 day disposition, that he was
incarcerated the entire time and thereby prejudiced and that
the prosecutor's offered justification is not supported by
anything tangible and is therefore inadequate.

Where an accuses

is incarcerated, the standard for proceeding quickly with the
prosecution, unless the defendant himself is the architect
of the delay, should be strict.

The consequences of pre-

trial, and in this case, pre-information incarceration, are
too onerous to permit deviation from the expeditious
disposition of the case for any but very substantial reasons.
The reason

articulated by the state of a continuing

investigation does not outweigh the right of an accused
who is incarcerated to have his day in court much sooner than
eleven months.

If the accused is not incarcerated, then

such a reason may be adequate.

With the accused in prison,

however, then more a compelling reason for delay should be
required -- such as the safety of an undercover investigator.
No such compelling reason is offered in the present case.
On balance, society's interest in the enforcement of the law
is severely tested when the exchange is the continued
incarceration of an innocent-until-proven-guilty accused.
The orderly and fair administration of justice, as mandated
by the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right, requires that a

-18-

t,011yer JUStification than simply the continuing of an
11 , ..

tiga t ion exist before any de lay is permitted in the

pr0secution of one who is incarcerated.
POINT II
DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL REQUIRES
DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM.
If the Court finds that the Appellant has been
denied his speedy trial right, then, although severe,
the only remedy available is the dismissal of the charges.
Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973); Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522

(1972).

CONCLUSION
The Sixth Amendment protects Appellant from the
hazards caused by delay of prosecution and trial.

Because

Appellant was arrested on October 15, 1981, his speedy
Lrial right attached as of that date.

The anxiety and

uncertainly caused by the State's unwarranted delay caused
to suffer prejudice, and, because the delay
Letween

and the filing of an Information, amounted to
months, Appellant's speedy trial right has been
Therefore, Appellant prays that this Court find
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that said right has been violated and that this Court
reverses the conviction of the lower court and orders that the
charges be dismissed.
DATED this

of June, 1984.
Respectfully submitted,

TffOMAS <(_:_ cCORMICK
Attorney or Appellant
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah this __{__day of June, 1984.
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